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Social cognition consists of several skills which allow us to interact with other humans.
These skills include social stimuli processing, drawing inferences about others’ mental
states, and engaging in social interactions. In recent years, there has been growing evi-
dence of social cognitive impairments in patients with schizophrenia. Apparently, these
impairments are separable from general neurocognitive impairments, such as attention,
memory, and executive functioning. Moreover, social cognition seems to be a main deter-
minant of functional outcome and could be used as a guide to elaborate new pharmaco-
logical and psychological treatments. However, most of these studies focus on individual
mechanisms and observational perspectives; only few of them study schizophrenic patients
during interactive situations.We first review evidences of social cognitive impairments both
in social stimuli processing and in mental state attribution. We focus on the relationship
between these functions and both general cognitive impairments and functional outcome.
We next review recent game theory approaches to the study of how social engagement
occurs in schizophrenic patients.The advantage of using game theory is that game-oriented
tasks can assess social decision making in an interactive everyday situation model. Finally,
we review proposed theoretical models used to explain social alterations and their under-
lying biological mechanisms. Based on interactive studies, we propose a framework which
takes into account the dynamic nature of social processes.Thus, understanding social skills
as a result of dynamical systems could facilitate the development of both basic research
and clinical applications oriented to psychiatric populations.
Keywords: social interaction, interactive view, social loop, game theory,mental state attribution, psychiatry disease
INTRODUCTION
Schizophrenia is one of the most disabling mental disorders for
adults all over the world. In spite of the great advances in antipsy-
chotic medication, people with schizophrenia have poor social
integration and several alterations in daily life skills. In recent years,
the focus of research in schizophrenia has shifted from reducing
classical symptomatology (e.g., positive symptoms) to increasing
functionality and social integration (Green and Horan, 2010). In
this context, the study of cognitive impairments and social cog-
nitive impairments has become a high-priority area of interest.
Social cognition generally refers to the sum of those processes that
allow individuals of the same species to interact with one another
(Adolphs, 1999; Frith and Frith, 2007). These processes include
understanding other people’s emotions, intentions and actions,
Abbreviations: ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; AI, anterior insula; AMY, amygdala;
BOLD, blood oxygen levels dependent; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; EBA,
extra-striate body area; EEG, electroencephalography; ERP, event-related potential;
FFA, fusiform face area; fMRI, funtional magnetic resonance imaging; HTH, hypo-
thalamus; MEG, magnetoencephalography; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; mPR,
medial parietal regions; MSA, mental state attribution; MT, middle temporal (or
visual area V5); OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; PC, precuneus. PCC, posterior cingulate
cortex; STS, superior temporal sulcus; TPJ, temporo-parietal junction; VS, ventral
striatum; vPMC, ventral premotor cortex.
and acting in social settings. However, social cognition is more
than figuring out other people; it also involves understanding with
others (De Jaegher et al., 2010). Thus, social cognition allows us
to sustain interactions, develop relations with others, understand
each other, and act together.
Notwithstanding the diversity of the symptoms and presen-
tations of schizophrenia, one of the most impressive common
denominators of the illness is a compromised social function-
ing of the affected individuals (Brüne, 2003). Early descrip-
tions of this pathology include the catatonia, affective symp-
toms, autism, and the abnormalities in emotional expression and
experiences as core features of schizophrenia (Kraepelin, 1899;
Bleuler, 1911). Naturalistic behavioral observations in chronic
non-medicated patients have revealed that their behavioral reper-
toire was severely restricted to the defense of a personal “territory,”
maintaining a rigid social hierarchy, avoiding any body contact,
and the absence of both friendship and mutual help among
patients (Staehelin, 1953). Similarly, non-chronic patients with
schizophrenia present problems in participating in social set-
tings and developing relations with other people (Grant, 1968).
Along this line, Lacan (1973) defines a schizophrenic as a person
who specifies himself/herself by not being caught up in any dis-
course, in any social link. From the philosophical point of view,
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Deleuze and Gauttari (1972) suggest that schizophrenia may be
generated by the conflict between individual desires and behavioral
social control (that is, desiring-machines/social-production con-
flict). Interestingly, these ideas are in line with current evidences
which indicate that schizophrenia is related both (1) to alterations
in a network of brain areas involved in social processing (Burns,
2004, 2006a,b) and (2) to the evolutionary cost of the changing
complexity of post-neolithic society (Abed and Abbas, 2011).
Recently, there has been growing interest in the study of social
cognition and its neuro-biological mechanisms in schizophrenic
patients. On one hand, clinical research on social skills clearly
indicates that this disorder is characterized by substantial, wide-
ranging social cognitive impairments (Green et al., 2008). On the
other hand, basic neuro-biological studies have identified certain
alterations in different brain areas and networks that may under-
lie these alterations. Nevertheless, there are contradictory findings,
likely due to the fact that most of these studies use a first person
perspective which follows the classical “perceptual” cognitive par-
adigm. This way of studying social skills does not capture the
wide and rich complexity of the human social world. Interest-
ingly, recent new approaches have challenged this perspective using
interactive paradigms to measure social skills in both healthy (De
Jaegher et al., 2010) and psychiatric populations (Kishida et al.,
2010).
DOMAINS OF SOCIAL COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENTS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
Clinical studies have shown that patients with schizophrenia
present alterations in a wide range of psychological tests that mea-
sure social skills. Although there is no complete consensus about
the hallmark of these impairments, two initiatives have emerged
for studying cognitive impairments in schizophrenia that include
social domains, namely Measurement and Treatment Research to
Improve Cognition in Schizophrenia (MATRICS), and Cognitive
Neuroscience for Treatment Research to Improve Cognition in
Schizophrenia (CNTRICS; Green et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2009).
These initiatives have proposed frameworks to conceptualize social
cognitive impairments and psychological tests that measure them.
Thus, using these frameworks, it is possible to schematize the
social skill domains in the following four areas: emotional pro-
cessing, social perception, attribution style, and theory of mind
(Green et al., 2005; Green and Horan, 2010). Emotional process-
ing involves the capacity to perceive socio-emotional stimuli and
the adaptive use of the emotions evoked by them. There is exten-
sive literature indicating alterations in face emotion processing
in schizophrenic patients (Marwick and Hall, 2008; Kohler et al.,
2010). Social perception refers to the ability to identify roles, rules,
and contexts in a social setting. This ability includes not only
the perception of individuals acting alone but also the capacity
to identify the nature of the relationships between individuals.
Attribution style reflects the way people tend to infer the cause
of a particular event. For example, psychiatric studies distinguish
external personal attributions (causes attributed to other people)
from both external situational attributions (causes attributed to
situational factors) and internal attributions (causes attributed
to oneself). Finally theory of mind, or mentalizing, is the ability
to infer, implicitly or explicitly, the intentions, dispositions, and
beliefs of others. Theory of mind has been widely addressed in
schizophrenia where most of the studies have found consistent
impairments when compared with healthy individuals (Brüne,
2005; Sprong et al., 2007).
SOCIAL COGNITION AS AN INDEPENDENT DOMAIN OF GENERAL
COGNITION
Why is social cognition studied separately from non-social cogni-
tion? For example, in order to figure out other people’s intentions,
it is necessary to recruit several processes shared with general non-
social cognition, such as attention, memory, and causality detec-
tion. Thus, alterations of social abilities could be a consequence of
other, more basic impairments of perceptual, or general non-social
cognition. Research dealing with this issue distinguishes three lines
of evidence which indicate that it is better to understand and study
social cognition separately.
One line arises from neuro-biological studies in healthy peo-
ple, indicating that social tasks activate specific brain areas that can
be distinguished from those activated by non-social tasks. Thus,
neuroimaging studies show that inferring physical causality acti-
vates mainly the lateral prefrontal cortex, whereas social causality
tasks activate the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; Harris et al.,
2005). Similarly, different activation has been observed between
inhibitory tasks that involve others’ beliefs (false belief reasoning)
and simple (non-social) behavioral inhibition (Rothmayr et al.,
2011). Further, a meta-analysis study concludes that if the reason-
ing is more social, then more activity in the mPFC is generated
(Van Overwalle, 2009). Thus, although social cognition requires
non-social capacities, the latter does not completely contain the
former.
Another line, which is consistent with the above, arises from
clinical studies in schizophrenic patients. These studies analyze
the relationship between the performance in a series of psycho-
logical tests that measure specifically social and non-social skills.
Generally, they have shown that social impairments dissociate
from non-social domains. For example, using structural equation
modeling and factorial analysis, two reports have shown that the
variance of the data is better explained when both social and non-
social cognition processes are two separate factors (Allen et al.,
2007; Sergi et al., 2007). In other words among patients, the varia-
tions in the results of cognitive tests are structured in two separate,
though related, domains, namely social and non-social cognition.
Other studies have investigated how cognitive impairments
impact in the daily functioning of these patients. Daily function-
ing measures how people perform in everyday situations, including
instrumental activities, interpersonal functioning, and vocational
achievement. These works reveal that the impairments in daily
functioning of schizophrenic patients are related to both social and
non-social cognitive domains (Couture et al., 2006, 2011). How-
ever, when social and non-social skills are analyzed together, they
are better predictors of functional outcome (Couture et al., 2011).
This means that social and non-social domains have an indepen-
dent influence on the everyday performance of these patients.
Further, several studies show that social cognition has a mediator
effect between neuro-cognition and functional outcome (Couture
et al., 2006; Bae et al., 2010; Schmidt et al., 2011b). In other words,
social and non-social cognition are associated with functional out-
come when they are studied separately, but when they are analyzed
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together, non-social cognition reduces or loses its association with
functional outcome. That is, it is possible that the impact of non-
social cognitive impairment in daily functioning occurs through
social cognitive impairments. Hence, it has been proposed that
social cognition is a more proximal factor in the causal mecha-
nism leading to real world performance. For example, to develop
interpersonal relationships, alterations in theory of mind have
stronger influence than memory alterations. However, memory
impairment can influence theory of mind performance which in
turn influences the ability to develop interpersonal relationships.
Finally, the last reason for focusing on social cognition impair-
ments is that they seem to be a life history stable trait that precedes,
and even predicts, the illness onset. Using a videotape recording
of a cohort of children having lunch, a study showed that alter-
ations of social behavior were the most significant predictors of
those children who developed schizophrenia in adulthood, even
more so than neuro-motor deficits (Schiffman et al., 2004). More-
over, individuals at ultra-high or family risk for psychosis present
social cognition alterations, especially in theory of mind (Chung
et al., 2008; Anselmetti et al., 2009; Eack et al., 2010; Gibson et al.,
2010; Kim et al., 2011a). These alterations can predict the psy-
chotic conversion (Chung et al., 2008; Anselmetti et al., 2009; Eack
et al., 2010; Gibson et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011a). Consistent
results were obtained in a study comparing social skills in prodro-
mal, first episode, and chronic patients, as well as in a longitudinal
one of first episode patients (Green et al., 2012; Horan et al., 2012).
Together, these studies show that social alterations are a stable trait
across the illness.
Taken together the results above, we have that social impair-
ments in schizophrenia are separable from general non-social cog-
nition and have a strong impact in daily performance. Thus, social
cognition seems to be a susceptible target of treatment for improv-
ing the integration of these patients in society. Indeed, social cogni-
tion is a potential prognostic factor for focusing early intervention
in susceptible populations. In this context, neuro-biological and
translational studies are crucial to the better understanding of the
underlying mechanisms of these impairments, which allows us to
elaborate adequate interventions. In the subsequent sections, we
review the main findings in this area, and we elaborate a framework
that can guide future research.
FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING STUDIES: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
In recent years, there has been an exponential increase in func-
tional neuroimaging studies (mostly using functional magnetic
resonance imaging, fMRI) and a sustained growth in electroen-
cephalographic (EEG) and magnetoencephalographic (MEG)
studies (Smith, 2012). Each of these techniques has advantages and
limitations, which must be taken into account before reviewing
current evidence.
The EEG is a direct measure of the electric field (or the magnetic
field, in the case of the MEG) generated by the electrical activity
of the brain at the scalp surface level. In spite of its high tempo-
ral resolution (milliseconds), each electrode integrates an area of
10 cm2, having a low spatial resolution (Buzsáki et al., 2012). On
the other hand, fMRI displays a hemodynamic signal and has a
much better spatial resolution than EEG. Specifically, the fMRI
measures the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signals
which represent the oxygenated hemoglobin. It is assumed that
a stronger BOLD signal reflects a greater demand for oxygenated
blood when neurons become electrically active in response to a
task (Logothetis, 2008). This change in the oxygenation level takes
place after neuronal activity with a peak delay of 4–5 s (Monti
et al., 2010; Murayama et al., 2010). This poor temporal resolution
of fMRI implies serious limitations for both the methodologies
used (e.g., statistics methods; Vul et al., 2009) and for the conclu-
sions of the results. For example, in social interaction studies using
imaging techniques, long time response intervals (e.g., larger than
12 s) are frequently used to optimize the BOLD signal. However,
in social tasks, changes in timing modify the behavior of players,
likely changing the underlying biological processes (Smith and
Silberberg, 2010; Rand et al., 2012). Interestingly, new comple-
mentary techniques, like high-density EEG recording combined
with source-modeling that can account for gyri and sulci (as
inferred from MRI imaging) of the subject, and simultaneous
EEG-fMRI recordings, can substantially improve the limitations
for each methodology considered alone (Esposito et al., 2009; Lei
et al., 2011).
PERCEIVING OTHERS
One of the first steps in socio-cognitive processing is the identi-
fication of both social relevant stimuli and their emotional value
(Ochsner, 2008). Several brain areas, such as the amygdala, the
insular cortex, and some regions of the temporal cortex, have
been related to this step in healthy people. Two types of stim-
uli have been the most studied in this context, namely human
faces and biological movements. Interestingly, patients with schiz-
ophrenia present alterations in the perception of these stimuli. For
a schematic representation of the principal brain areas participat-
ing in social processing, see Figure 1, and for a schematic summary
of the principal evidences in schizophrenic patients, see Figure 2.
OTHERS’ FACES
Undoubtedly, the human face is one of the most important sources
of social information. Thus, a great deal of research has been car-
ried out on face processing in both healthy and schizophrenic
people. Face identification and face emotion recognition have
been two of the most studied and reported impairments in schiz-
ophrenic patients (Whittaker et al., 2001; Marwick and Hall, 2008;
Kohler et al., 2010; Li et al., 2010). In relation to face recognition,
studies generally use tasks where people have to decide whether
two faces in different positions are the same person or whether the
face presented is a familiar/famous person. These studies mostly
show that performance of schizophrenic individuals is worse than
that of healthy individuals (Marwick and Hall, 2008). In imaging
studies, these impairments are related to functional and struc-
tural alterations of the fusiform gyrus (Quintana et al., 2003;
Marwick and Hall, 2008). Using EEG, the N170 event-related
potential (ERP) has been associated to structural face process-
ing, being likely generated in the fusiform gyrus. Most studies
on schizophrenic patients have found a decrease in the ampli-
tude of this component (Campanella et al., 2006; Caharel et al.,
2007; Turetsky et al., 2007; Lynn and Salisbury, 2008), although
some have found that it is normal or increasing (Wynn et al.,
2008; Ramos-Loyo et al., 2009). One possible explanation for the
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FIGURE 1 | Brain areas that participate in social processing. A simple
classification of brain areas involved in social processing differentiates regions
that participate in four related processes. The first is the perception of basic
social stimuli, such as biological motions (V5), part of the body (extra-striate
body area, EBA), and faces (fusiform face area, FFA). Another process
includes emotional and motivational appraisal, where the amygdala (AMY),
the anterior insula (AI), the subgenual and perigenual anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), as well as the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) participate. These cortical
structures are in interaction with subcortical structures as the ventral striatum
(VS), and the hypothalamus (HTH). These structures in turn interact with other
regions which participate in the goal-directed, adaptive behaviors, and the
categorization processes, such as the dorsolateral and the medial prefrontal
cortex (dlPFC, mPFC) and the ACC. Finally for social attribution, areas like the
ventral premotor cortex (vPMC), the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the AI,
the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and the precuneus (PC) participate in
more automatic, bottom-up inferences of other people’s mental states;
whereas structures like the mPFC and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) are
involved in more cognitive theory of mind skills.
FIGURE 2 | Schematic summary of the evidences of social
cognitive impairments and their underlying neuro-biological
mechanisms in schizophrenic patients.The color circles represent
the levels of available evidences from behavioral data (within orange
rectangles), and neuroimaging data (within gray rectangle). AMY,
amygdala; FFA, fusiform face area; STS, superior temporal sulcus; AI,
anterior insula; TPJ, temporo-parietal junction; mPFC, medial
prefrontal cortex; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; OFC,
orbitofrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; PCC, posterior
cingulate cortex.
discrepant results is that the deficit depends on the degree of
other cognitive demands, mainly memory load (Whittaker et al.,
2001). Another explanation is that this deficit depends on early
visual processing. In most of the preceding studies, there is a
consistency between the modulation of the N170 and that of the
P100, which is an early ERP component that reflects early visual
processing (Campanella et al., 2006; Caharel et al., 2007; Wynn
et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2010). More research is needed to fur-
ther understand these early stages of structural face processing
in schizophrenia.
Another important characteristic of the human face is the trans-
mission of emotional states. The ability to recognize the emotions
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displayed by others is crucial in social interactions. It has been
proposed that misinterpretation of facial affect is a mechanism
that can lead to symptoms such as paranoia and persecutory delu-
sions in schizophrenia (Frith, 1996). Despite heterogenic designs
and paradigms used to address this issue, a recent meta-analysis
of 86 studies reveals a large deficit in emotional face processing in
schizophrenic patients (Kohler et al., 2010). In this work, the edu-
cational factor, as a rough measure of neuro-cognition, was not
related to emotion recognition. This finding agrees with another
report which asserts that affect recognition is an independent fac-
tor of non-social cognition (Pan et al., 2009). Interestingly, early
visual processing and face identification influence the impair-
ments in affect recognition only for negative emotions, but not
for positive emotions (Norton et al., 2009). This fact suggests a
close relationship between affect recognition and visual process-
ing, but the former is not fully explained by the latter. Similarly,
social cognition mediates the effect of early visual alterations in the
functional outcome of schizophrenic patients (Sergi et al., 2006).
Notably, when the patients had evaluated faces with either contex-
tual sentences or concomitant emotional congruent sounds, their
performances were similar to those of healthy people (Lee et al.,
2012; Müller et al., 2012). These results stress the need for devel-
oping more ecological experimental tasks in order to extrapolate
the laboratory data to the daily performance of patients.
Concerning the neurobiology of this impairment, when pro-
cessing facial expressions of emotions, neuroimaging studies have
shown that schizophrenic patients activate regions similar to those
of control samples, namely bilateral amygdala and right fusiform
gyrus (Li et al., 2010; see Figure 1). Most of these studies have
found that the extent of the activations in these patients is more
limited, while other studies revealed that schizophrenic patients
over-activated the amygdala when observing neutral faces. This
effect could produce the observed hypo-activation while looking
at fearful faces (Kosaka et al., 2002; Holt et al., 2006; Surguladze
et al., 2006; Hall et al., 2008). Interestingly, a patient with amyg-
dala damage recovered the ability to recognize fearful faces when
she was instructed to fix her attention on the eyes (Adolphs et al.,
2005), and other studies have shown that only early amygdala
damage generates theory of mind impairment in contrast to adult-
hood damage (Shaw et al., 2004). The preceding facts indicate
that the amygdala may have a role in some precursor processes of
social cognition, such as joint attention. When comparing these
findings with those of schizophrenic patients, some authors have
proposed a dysregulation of the amygdala in response to social
stimuli in schizophrenia. This dysregulation is probably generated
by an impaired control from the mPFC (Brunet-Gouet and Decety,
2006).
Another brain area related to emotion recognition impairment
in schizophrenic patients is the insular cortex. The insula is an
interoceptive cortex which senses the inner state of the body. Its
alterations have been reported in many diseases, such as anxiety
disorders and drug addiction (Contreras et al., 2008, 2012). A spe-
cific role of the insula in the recognition of emotional expressions
of disgust, a primitive function related to the appraisal of dis-
tasteful or dangerous stimuli, has been reported (Phillips et al.,
1997; Wicker et al., 2003). In schizophrenic patients, a dimin-
ished activation of the anterior insula has been associated to a
deficit in recognizing the expression of disgust (Phillips et al., 1999;
Williams et al., 2007). However, the biological mechanism underly-
ing this alteration is not simple. Using neuro-feedback to increase
the anterior insula activity in schizophrenic patients, a recent study
showed an improvement in disgust recognition, while a worsening
in happy face recognition (Ruiz et al., 2013). This result highlights
the participation of a network of interacting brain areas instead of
specialized, isolated areas.
On the other hand, EEG studies have focused on the N250
component, which is modulated by the emotional valences of
faces (Krolak-Salmon et al., 2001). This component presents a
fronto-central topography and has been related to a later emo-
tional processing of faces. In schizophrenic patients studies have
found mixed results. Two studies found a normal N170, although
reduced N250, components, suggesting that deficits in facial affect
recognition are not due to abnormalities in facial feature encod-
ing, but rather due to specific deficits in the decoding of emotional
information (Streit et al., 2001; Wynn et al., 2008). Other studies
found abnormal N170, though normal N250, components, imply-
ing that facial feature encoding is abnormal, but affect decoding
remains unaffected (Streit et al., 2001; Johnston et al., 2005). Inter-
estingly, when examining the results of the preceding studies, P100
alterations are in concomitance with N170 alterations, though not
with N250 alterations. In schizophrenic patients, structural face
processing is probably more dependent on early visual process-
ing, whereas emotional processing is more dependent on other
alterations. Thus, patient-to-patient variations could lead to the
observed differences in the results. Similarly, a behavioral study
revealed that impairments in both early visual processing and
structural face processing do not explain the affect recognition
impairment (Norton et al., 2009). Nonetheless, there have not
been enough studies carried out to corroborate this possibility.
OTHERS’ MOVEMENTS
Another important social stimulus is the movement of social
agents. Humans have the tendency to interpret motion as social
and intentional if it has biological plausibility despite the fact that
its agent may not be biological. For example, geometric shapes
moving on a screen (Heider and Simmel, 1944). Moreover, the
biological coherent motion of light points representing joints
is interpreted as human movements (Johansson, 1973). There
are several studies which reveal that the perception of biologi-
cal motion is related to an action-observation network (or mirror
network), which is generally considered to consist of three bilateral
cortical areas that are reciprocally connected, namely the ventral
premotor cortex, the inferior parietal lobule, and the superior tem-
poral sulcus (STS, see Figures 1 and 2; Keysers and Perrett, 2004).
Interestingly, biological motion perception has been proposed
as a hallmark of social cognition impairments in developmen-
tal diseases, like autism (Pavlova, 2012). There are, however, few
studies about perception of biological motion in schizophrenic
patients. Studies in this step of social processing are important,
since biological motion perception activates several areas involved
in schizophrenic symptomatology. For example, the STS and the
inferior-parietal lobule (including the temporo-parietal junction,
TPJ, Figures 1 and 2) are implicated in mental state attribution
(MSA), emotion, and self-representation or agency. Further, these
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regions are either adjacent to or overlapping with regions impli-
cated in language-related symptoms of the schizophrenic syn-
drome, such as auditory verbal hallucinations (Torrey, 2007; Wible
et al., 2009). Thus, research on this step of social processing can
provide more evidences of the physiopathology chain leading to
schizophrenic symptoms.
In this context, reports about biological motion using light
points show that schizophrenic patients have an altered perception
as compared to healthy individuals (Kim et al., 2005, 2011b; Singh
et al., 2011). In EEG studies, this impairment is related to a decrease
of theµ rhythm suppression that is related to the mirror activity of
sensory-motor cortex (Singh et al., 2011). In neuroimaging stud-
ies, the impairment has been associated to an alteration of the STS
activity (Kim et al., 2011b). Behaviorally, schizophrenic patients
tend to describe non-biological motion as biological. Similarly,
they present a greater STS activity in non-biological motion than
that of control samples (Kim et al., 2011b). Interestingly, there is
no difference between the activities of visual area MT (related to
motion perception) of both groups. This finding reveals that the
impairment of biological motion perception is not due to basic
visual alterations. There could probably be either an STS dysregu-
lation or a decoupling of STS activity from other areas of the social
brain network. Similarly, studies of emotion processing show a
dysregulation in the amygdala activity. However, in light of cur-
rent evidences, this is only a speculative interpretation requiring
further analyses.
In summary, patients with schizophrenia present alterations
of the perception of specific social stimuli, such as face emotion
and biological motions. These alterations are not fully explained
through either early perceptual or non-social cognitive impair-
ments. Temporal regions, like the amygdala and the STS, partic-
ipate in the neuro-biological mechanism underlying these alter-
ations, which is best described as activity abnormally evoked by
non-social stimuli. Interestingly, this is consistent with interpreta-
tions which point out that over-interpreting stimuli as social and
intentional is the basis for paranoid symptoms and persecutory
delusions (Abu-Akel and Bailey, 2000).
UNDERSTANDING OTHERS
In order to participate in the rich human social life, it is necessary
not only to perceive others, but also to understand them. Cru-
cially, we attribute an inner mental world to those agents, and we
infer their intentions, beliefs, and wishes through several sources.
The ability to do so, called MSA, or theory of mind, or mentaliz-
ing, allows us to maintain social interactions. In healthy people,
neuro-biological studies typically contrast mentalizing tasks with
control conditions in which no MSA is required. These studies
have identified the activation of a network of brain areas which
includes the mPFC, the STS, the TPJ, and the inferior parietal lob-
ule (Van Overwalle, 2009). Functional and structural disruption
of the neuro-biological mechanisms underlying the MSA may give
rise to various mental illnesses that include schizophrenia (Frith,
2004).
There are several evidences indicating an MSA impairment
in schizophrenic patients (Brüne, 2005; Sprong et al., 2007).
Interestingly, this deficit is independent of general cognitive
impairments, such as attention, memory, and executive function.
For example, when it is necessary to infer others’ mental states,
patients sorting a sequence of pictures do not perform as well
as when it is necessary only to infer physical causality (Brunet
et al., 2003a). Regarding neuroimaging studies, the most repli-
cated finding is a reduction of mPFC activity as compared to that
of control subjects (Brunet-Gouet and Decety, 2006). This pattern
has been replicated using diverse paradigms, such as short history
comprehension and comic-trip protocols. By contrast, research on
mentalizing has led to contradictory results concerning temporal
and parietal regions. Using non-verbal comic-trip tasks, studies
have found a hypo-activation of the TPJ (Benedetti et al., 2009;
Walter et al., 2009; Vistoli et al., 2011b), whereas others have
found a hyper-activation of the TPJ and the STS (Brüne et al.,
2008; Benedetti et al., 2009). Moreover, a study has found strong
STS activity in both schizophrenic patients and control individ-
uals (Brunet et al., 2003b). Interestingly, studies using MEG and
EEG in healthy people have shown that parietal and temporal
activations occur earlier than frontal activation (McCleery et al.,
2011; Vistoli et al., 2011a; Billeke et al., 2012). For example, in
an interactive game, there is an activity in the alpha range which
anticipates the other player’s behavior. This activity is first found in
the temporo-parietal region and, subsequently, in the medial pre-
frontal region (Billeke et al., 2012). Using MEG in schizophrenic
patients, the STS, the TPJ, and the inferior parietal lobule show
a hypo-activation which correlates with task performance (Vistoli
et al., 2011b). One possible explanation for these disparate results
is the existence of an abnormal agency processing in schizophrenia
(Brunet-Gouet et al., 2011). The hyper-activation of the parietal
regions and the cingulate cortex has been related to passivity symp-
toms (Spence et al., 1997). Thus, the increase of parietal activity
related to mentalizing tasks could be due to the tendency to per-
ceive one’s own thoughts and actions as alien-made (Brüne et al.,
2008).
However, the relationship between the finding in the MSA task
and functional outcome is not straightforward. In most of the
MSA tasks, people have to evaluate social situations in which they
do not participate. Thus, the classical MSA paradigms require the
ability to take a perspective out of the social exchange that is being
assessed. Therefore, on the one hand, performance in the classical
MSA task might be affected by the impairments in the capacity
to take a perspective or agency. On the other hand, in everyday
situations, people require the capacity to attribute intentions to
their partners during a social exchange. These “online” MSAs are
not assessed in classical tasks (Frith and Singer, 2008). In our next
section, we review recent evidences using interactive paradigms to
evaluate “online” social processing.
UNDERSTANDING WITH OTHERS
The goal of the social skills of above is to allow us to participate
adequately in social exchanges. In order to do so, however, we
require to not only perceive social agents and understand their
inner worlds, but also need the capacity to make decisions, antic-
ipate their decisions, and act together. This is a crucial step in
the chain of social cognitive abilities that lead us to surf prop-
erly in our complex social world. Despite this fact, only recently
has cognitive neuroscience begun to study social skills in interac-
tive settings where subjects have to make decisions in accordance
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with how they believe their partners might react. For example,
there is growing interest in studying how people coordinate their
motor actions in social settings (Sebanz et al., 2006; Dumas et al.,
2010; Schmidt et al., 2011a). Using game theory, recent research
has assessed the way people interact with each other and how they
compete or cooperate for an incentive (Camerer and Fehr, 2006;
Lee, 2008). The game theory approach has a series of advantages
over classical “perceptual” paradigms that enables us to evaluate
social cognition in mental diseases (Kishida et al., 2010) as follows.
First, these paradigms give us the possibility to evaluate social deci-
sion making in ecological paradigms where the result of a player’s
decision depends on the decisions of the other player. Next, game
theory provides a series of “optimal”decisions or behaviors in each
game. This optimal, or normal, behavior is a function of both the
rational construction of the game and the social norm of fair-
ness. Interestingly, this social norm varies according to cultural
differences (Henrich et al., 2005, 2006, 2010). Therefore, optimal
behavior represents an indicator of social adaptation. Finally, we
can evaluate how the behavior of a specific population, for example
patients with schizophrenia, deviates from the optimal solution in
a given setting. Importantly, since this deviation can be measured
and correlated with certain biological activity, it could help us to
identify biological markers of this behavior and potential targets
of medical intervention (Kishida et al., 2010).
Using game theory, research on schizophrenic patients could
shed light on their ability to maintain social exchange. Recently,
there has been a series of studies on schizophrenic patients playing
the ultimatum game (Agay et al., 2008; Wischniewski et al., 2009;
Csukly et al., 2011; van’t Wout and Sanfey, 2011; Wischniewski
and Brune, 2011). This game involves two players, the proposer
and the responder, who have to split a certain amount of money
following a bargaining logic of “take-it-or-leave-it” (Güth et al.,
1982). The proposer makes an offer as to how the money should
be split between the two. The responder can either accept or reject
the offer. If the offer is accepted, the money is split as proposed,
but if it is rejected, neither player receives any money. Rationally,
the proposer should offer the least sum of money other than zero,
and the responder should accept any non-zero offers. However, as
we remarked above, behaviors in this game also integrate the social
norm of “fairness.” Thus, in occidental societies, proposers offer
40% of the money to be split as their modal offer and responders
reject offers less than 30% half of the times.
Interestingly, schizophrenic patients deviate from this normal
behavior. As proposers, these patients make offers greater than
the 50% social norm, called “hyperfair” offers (Agay et al., 2008).
Moreover, patient behavior is less strategic. Control individuals
tend to increase their offers after a rejection and decrease them
after an acceptance, whereas patients make more erratic offers after
a rejection. Similarly, using a sample of students, a study reveals
that schizotypal traits correlate with the sum of money offered
(van’t Wout and Sanfey, 2011). In other words, normal people with
schizotypal traits tend to offer more money (“hyperfair” offers)
than people without them. This study also used another version of
the game, called the dictator game, that is similar to the ultimatum
game where the receptor plays a passive role without the possibility
of rejecting the proposer’s offer. Notably in this game, schizotypal
traits do not correlate with the money offered. This means that, in
the ultimatum game, the hyperfair offers are not due to a different
understanding of fairness, but due to a strategic behavior. This
fact is corroborated by the behavior of the schizophrenic patients
playing a third-party punishment game. In this game, the patients,
see other people playing the dictator game and have the possibility
to punish the dictator for an unfair offer, or in other words they
can decide to lose a portion of their earnings in order to punish
the dictator. Interestingly, under these conditions, schizophrenic
patients punish the dictator’s unfair offers just as healthy people
do (Wischniewski and Brune, 2011). On the other hand, as respon-
ders, schizophrenic patients present a greater rate of acceptances of
unfair offers and a smaller rate of rejections to fair offers (Csukly
et al., 2011). However, the rejection rate increases as a function of
the unfairness of the offers just like in healthy individuals (Wis-
chniewski and Brune, 2011). The students with schizotypal traits
used in the study of above presented the same pattern of behavior
(van’t Wout and Sanfey, 2011).
Taken together, these results show that schizophrenic patients
deviate from normal behavior by making more fair offers and
accepting more unfair offers. This pattern is not explained by the
change of the sense of fairness because the patients reject unfair
offers and punish the other players’ unfair offers. However, when
they face a person who can punish their behavior (rejecting their
offer), they make “hyperfair” offers. A possible explanation for
these behaviors is that schizophrenic patients can evaluate fairness
and anticipate the others’ decisions, but avoid possible punish-
ments by increasing the offer. In a certain way, this is congruent
with a study that uses a variation of the public goods game. In this
game, each player (commonly more than two) invests a portion of
his/her earnings in both private and public accounts. The alloca-
tion of the gathered public goods is equal regardless of the amount
of each individual’s investment. If a minimum proportion of the
participants invest in the public accounts (the minimum public
goods), all receive an additional incentive. A free riding is some-
one who invests no-money in the public accounts, but receives the
investment of the other participants. Schizophrenic patients play-
ing this game present a smaller rate of free riding (Chung et al.,
2013) which the authors interpret as impairments in the sensitivity
to losses. However, this is also consistent with an attitude to avoid
a possible social rejection represented, in this case, by the failure
to achieve the minimum public goods. Nevertheless, this does not
explain the more erratic behavior after either a rejection in the ulti-
matum game or a failure in the public goods game. The patients
probably also have problems in anticipating how their partners
could react to their decisions. Thus, an impairment of this prag-
matic aspect of the MSA may cause these erratic behaviors after a
negative response.
These interactive studies are still incipient and most of them
evaluated only one-shot games. However, the daily social situations
are characterized by a repetitive interaction with the same people.
Thus, the history of previous interactions is crucial to both figuring
out the others’ intentions and adapting our decisions accordingly.
Our laboratory results show that healthy people take into account
prior interactions with the same partner in order to both antic-
ipate their partner’s behaviors and elaborate their reactions to
these behaviors. Interestingly, the mPFC and the temporo-parietal
region are strongly related to these processes (Billeke et al., 2012).
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In the context of schizophrenic patients, it is important to begin
using interactive and repetitive paradigms with certain biological
measurements, such as neuroimaging or EEG, in order to unravel
neuro-biological mechanisms underlying social impairments. We
believe that new approaches to social cognition, like game theory,
will give us the opportunity to achieve this.
MODELS FOR SOCIAL COGNITION
Recently, several theoretical frameworks have been proposed to
guide research on social cognition impairments in schizophrenia.
In this context, findings in social and affective neuroscience are rel-
evant to proposing separable psychopathological constructs based
on the knowledge of cortical functions.
Thus, Ochsner (2008) proposes several dissociated constructs
which participate in socio-emotional processing. This model pro-
poses five constructs based on differentiated brain systems to
distinguish dissociated impairments in schizophrenia. The first
is the acquisition of social values and responses. The amygdala
and the striatum are the two neural systems most strongly impli-
cated in affective learning. These systems are evolutionarily old and
receive multi-modal perceptual inputs. The mPFC and the insula
also play key roles in affective learning via interconnection with the
amygdala and the striatum. The second construct is recognizing
and responding to social affective stimuli. Striatal and mPFC sys-
tems have also been implicated in recognizing stimuli whose values
they encode. Interestingly, as we have shown above, other struc-
tures implicated in this construct are the amygdala and the STS
which are related to the alteration of the perception of social stim-
uli in schizophrenic patients. The third construct is the “embodied
simulation”or low-level mental state inference. Based on studies of
“mirror systems,” several areas participate in this shared represen-
tation, including the inferior parietal, the premotor, the cingulate,
and the insular cortices. These areas provide a basis for the vic-
arious empathic experience and, therefore, for the understanding
of others’ actions, pains, or disgusts (Frith and Frith, 2012). The
fourth construct is the high-level mental state and trait inferences.
In this construct, the more complex judgments about others are
processed. The participating areas are the mPFC, the STS, the
TPJ, and the medial parietal regions. These areas have also been
implicated in schizophrenic impairments. The fifth, and final, con-
struct is the context sensitive regulation. This construct concerns
the ability to regulate one’s judgments about and behavior toward
others in a context appropriate manner. This regulatory ability
manifests it self in different ways with distinct sets of underlying
neural systems in lateral and medial prefrontal regions.
SOCIAL LOOP
Interestingly, the constructs explained above have several shared
areas and possibly shared neural systems. Moreover, the abnormal-
ities taking place within any of these five constructs would concern
directly the ability to represent others’ mental or emotional states.
For this reason, other authors have proposed an integration of
these constructs within a cohesive neurocognitive model (Decety
et al., 2007; Brunet-Gouet et al., 2011). This proposal considers
the existence of a “global” representation space that encompasses
the cognitive systems which allow the online representation of
things, persons, general semantic knowledge/associations, as well
as more specific and complex past events. These representations
are at the core of the information processing chain that allows us
to make sense of our social environment and guide our daily social
interactions. This online representation space can be subdivided
into several subspaces, each of which deals with a specific type
of social information and has a specific underlying brain system
(Brunet-Gouet et al., 2011). Each of these brain systems is a specific
interconnection among different brain areas of the global system
rather than a modular brain system. We propose that each indi-
vidual’s online representation space is coupled with that of other
people. Thus, this coupling or engagement between two or more
systems forms a global social system or social loop (see Figure 3),
allowing us to interact with others, being generated by that interac-
tion (Hari and Kujala, 2009). Crucially, this social loop has strong
communication with both the sensory and the general cognitive
systems. On the one hand, the social loop takes crucial informa-
tion from the preceding systems (for example, memory of prior
interactions) in order to generate adaptive behaviors. On the other
hand, the social loop makes predictions on how the other agents
might probably react to our behavior (for example, sensory predic-
tions) and conveys them to the sensorial and the cognitive systems.
Thus, this model incorporates the interactive nature of social cog-
nition to the models which were proposed previously (see also De
Jaegher et al., 2010). Interestingly, schizophrenic patients present
alterations in both the subsidiary systems (e.g., sensory and cog-
nitive systems) and the global social system. These impairments
generate inadequate sensory predictions and behaviors that lead
to a decoupling of the social loop and the poor social performance
of schizophrenic patients.
While the skills which allow people to surf appropriately in
their social world are not limited to understanding with others,
they include both understanding and interacting with the social
norms or cultural constraints (Vogeley and Roepstorff, 2009).
Thus, both the perception of and the engagement with others are
mediated by what people are expected to perceive and how people
are expected to engage with others in their particular social and
cultural context. For instance, there are cultural differences in the
way how people make causal inferences in social contexts (Mason
and Morris, 2010). Interestingly, cultural factors are in continuous
dialectic interaction and exchange with individuals which consti-
tute a specific culture. It follows that cultural factors and individual
social practices exhibit a “looping effect” (Vogeley and Roepstorff,
2009). However, the study of the biological mechanisms of cultural
social perception and engagement, and its implications in mental
illnesses is a relatively unexplored area (Mehta et al., 2011).
CONCLUSION
Humans are an intrinsically social and gregarious species, and
virtually all of their actions (including their thoughts, desires,
and feelings) are directed toward others or produced in response
to others (Batson, 1990). Schizophrenic patients have problems
with their interaction with other people and their integration in
society. These problems seem to be due to specific impairments
in social processing rather than consequences of general cogni-
tive alterations. These impairments include at least three levels of
processing, namely (1) the perception of social stimuli, (2) the
understanding of other people’s mental states, and (3) the way in
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FIGURE 3 | Schematic representation of individual global spaces and
the social loop. Each person has a brain system generating global social
representations. This system includes areas like the superior temporal
sulcus (STS), the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the medial parietal
regions (mPR), and the temporo-parietal junction, among others. The global
space has a strong relationship and interconnections with other systems
(sensory, cognitive, and motor systems) that provide and receive
information from them. By mean of these interconnections, the system
generates adequate predictions and behaviors that allows the coupling of
two, or more, individuals. For similar and complementary proposals see
Decety et al. (2007), Hari and Kujala (2009), De Jaegher et al. (2010),
Brunet-Gouet et al. (2011).
which people interact with other people and society. These steps
involve different brain areas and different interactions or networks
among the areas. In spite of the growing interest in the study of
social cognition in schizophrenia, most of the research carried out
in this area uses non-interactive paradigms, which do not capture
the dynamic nature of the social phenomena involved. Hence, we
propose a framework which does include the interactive nature of
social skills. We believe that considering social skills as a result of
dynamic, coupled systems is crucial to the better understanding of
social cognition in both healthy people and psychopathologies, like
schizophrenia. The use of these interactive paradigms, such as tasks
based on game theory, allows us to develop clinical applications
oriented to measuring and improving social skills in psychiatric
populations.
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